Over the
life of the
contract,
INSLAW made
several
attempts to
reach an
agreement
with the
Department
over its
proprietary
rights to
the
Enhanced
PROMIS
software.
The
Department,
however,
steadfastly
refused to
conduct any
meaningful
negotiations
and
exhibited
little
inclination
to resolve
the
controversy.
In the
meantime,
INSLAW was
pushed to
the brink
of
financial
ruin
because the
Department
withheld at
least $1.6
million in
critical
contract
payments on
questionable
grounds,
and in
February
1985 was
forced to
file for
protection
under
chapter 11
of the
Bankruptcy
Code in
order to
stay
economically
viable.
INSLAW at
this time
had
installed
PROMIS at
the 20
largest
U.S.
attorneys'
offices
across the
country as
required by
the
contract.7
The
Department
had earlier
canceled
installation
of PROMIS
at the 74
smaller
offices.
While
refusing to
engage in
good faith
negotiations
with
INSLAW, Mr.
Brewer and
Mr.
Videnieks,
with the
approval of
high level
Justice
Department
officials,
proceeded
to take
actions to
misappropriate
the
Enhanced
PROMIS
software.
These
officials
knew that
INSLAW had
installed
Enhanced
PROMIS at
the 20
sites. Yet,
without
notice, and
certainly
without
permission,
the
Department
of Justice
illegally
copied
INSLAW's
Enhanced
PROMIS
software
and
installed
it
eventually
at 25
additional
U.S.
attorneys'
offices.
The
Department
reportedly
also
brought
another 31
U.S.
attorneys,
offices
"on-line"
to Enhanced
PROMIS
systems via
telecommunications.
INSLAW
first
learned of
these
unauthorized
actions in
September
1985, and
notified
the
Department
that it
must remove
the
Enhanced
PROMIS
software or
arrange for
license
agreements.
When the
Department
refused,
INSLAW
subsequently
filed a
claim
against
Justice in
the Federal
Bankruptcy
Court which
eventually
led to the
Bankruptcy's
Court's
finding
that the
Department's
actions
"were done
in bad
faith,
vexatiously,
in wanton
disregard
of the law
and the
facts, and
for
oppressive
reasons" to
drive
INSLAW out
of business
and to
convert, by
trickery,
fraud and
deceit,
INSLAW's
PROMIS
software.
When the
case was
appealed by
the
Department,
Senior
District
Court Judge
William
Bryant
concurred
with the
Bankruptcy
Court and
was very
critical of
the
Department's
handling of
the case.
In his
ruling, at
49a, Judge
Bryant
stated:
The Government accuses the bankruptcy court of looking beyond the bankruptcy proceeding to find culpability by the Government. What is strikingly apparent from the testimony and depositions of key witnesses and many documents is that INSLAW performed its contract in a hostile environment that extended from the higher echelons of the Justice Department to the officials who had the day-to-day responsibility for supervising its work. [Emphasis added.]
Recently,
the posture
of some
Department
officials
has been to
attempt to
exonerate
the
Department's
handling of
the INSLAW
matter by
citing the
fact that
the Court
of Appeals
has vacated
the
Bankruptcy
and
District
Courts'
judgment
involving
illegal
misconduct
of the
Department
including
violations
of the
automatic
stay
provisions
of the
Bankruptcy
Code.
However,
the D.C.
Circuit's
opinion was
grounded
primarily
on
jurisdictional
questions
and did not
address the
substantive
merits of
the
findings of
fact and
conclusions
of law of
either the
Bankruptcy
Court or
the ruling
of the U.S.
District
Court.
Based on
the facts
presented
in court
and the
committee's
review of
Department
records, it
does indeed
appear that
Justice
officials,
including
Mr. Brewer
and Mr.
Videnieks,
never
intended to
fully honor
the
proprietary
rights of
INSLAW or
bargain in
good faith
with the
company.
The
Bankruptcy
Court found
that:
Š [The Department] engaged in an outrageous, deceitful, fraudulent game of cat and mouse, demonstrating contempt for both the law and any principle of fair dealing. [Finding No. 266 at 138.]
As the
Bankruptcy
and
District
Courts
found on
the merits,
it is very
unlikely
that Mr.
Brewer and
Mr.
Videnieks
acted alone
to violate
the
proprietary
rights of
INSLAW in
this
matter. In
explaining
his own
actions,
Mr. Brewer,
the project
manager,
has
repeatedly
stated that
he was not
acting out
any
personal
vendetta
against
INSLAW and
that high
level
Department
officials
including
Lowell
Jensen were
aware of
every
decision he
made with
regard to
the
contract.
Mr. Brewer
stated,
under oath
that there
was
somebody in
the
Department
at a higher
level,
looking
over the
shoulder of
not just me
but the
people who
worked for
meŠ.''8 The
PROMIS
Oversight
Committee,
headed by
Deputy
Attorney
General
Lowell
Jensen,
kept a
close watch
over the
administration
of the
contract
and was
involved in
every major
decision.
Mr. Jensen,
who worked
with former
Attorney
General
Edwin Meese
in the
Alameda
County
district
attorneys'
offices,
stated
under oath
that he
kept the
Attorney
General
regularly
informed of
all aspects
of the
INSLAW
contract.
The PROMIS
Oversight
Committee
readily
agreed with
Mr.
Brewer's
recommendation
to cancel
part of
INSLAW's
contract
for default
because of
the
controversy
regarding
the
installation
of PROMIS
in word
processing
systems at
the 74
smaller
U.S.
attorneys'
offices.
Mr.
Brewer's
proposal
was
ultimately
rejected
only
because a
Justice
contracts
attorney
advised the
oversight
committee
that the
Department
did not
have the
legal
authority
to do so.
Curiously,
the
recommendation
to find
INSLAW in
default
occurred
shortly
after
INSLAW and
the
Department
signed a
modification
to the
contract
(Mod. 12),
which was
supposed to
end the
conflict
over
proprietary
rights.
Mr. Jensen,
who is
currently a
Federal
District
Court judge
in San
Francisco,
served at
the Justice
Department
successively
as
Assistant
Attorney
General in
charge of
the
Criminal
Division,
Associate
Attorney
General and
Deputy
Attorney
General
between
1981 and
1986. The
Bankruptcy
court found
that he
"had a
previously
developed
negative
attitude
about
PROMIS and
INSLAW"
from the
beginning
(Findings
No.
307-309)
because he
had been
associated
with the
development
of a rival
case
management
system
while he
was a
district
attorney in
California,
and that
this
experience,
at the very
least,
affected
his
judgment
throughout
his
oversight
of the
contract.
During a
sworn
statement,
Judge
Jensen
denied
being
biased
against
INSLAW, but
averred
that he did
not have
complete
recollection
of the
events
surrounding
his
involvement
in the
contract.
However,
based on
the
committee's
own
investigation
it is clear
that Judge
Jensen was
not
particularly
interested
or active
in pursuing
INSLAW's
claims that
Department
officials
were biased
against the
company and
had taken
action to
harm the
company.
Perhaps
most
disturbing,
he
remembered
very few
details of
the PROMIS
Oversight
Committee
meetings
even though
he had
served as
its
chairman
and was
certainly
one of its
most
influential
members. He
stated that
after a
meeting
with former
Attorney
General
Elliot
Richardson
(representing
INSLAW)
regarding
the alleged
Brewer
bias, he
commissioned
his deputy,
Mr. Jay
Stephens,
to conduct
an
investigation
of the bias
charges.
Based on
this
investigation,
Judge
Jensen said
he
concluded
that there
were no
bias
problems
associated
with the
Department's
handling of
the INSLAW
contract.
This
assertion,
however,
contradicted
Mr.
Stephens,
who
testified
during a
sworn
statement
that he was
never asked
by Judge
Jensen to
conduct an
investigation
of the
Brewer bias
allegations
raised by
Mr.
Richardson
and others.
Mr.
Stephens,
recollection
of the
events was
sharp and
complete in
stark
contrast to
Judge
Jensen's.
As a
result,
many
questions
remain
about the
accuracy
and
completeness
of Judge
Jensen's
recollections
and
statements.
As for the
PROMIS
Oversight
Committee,
committee
investigators
were told
that
detailed
minutes
were not
kept at any
of the
meetings,
nor was
there any
record of
specific
discussions
by its
members
affecting
the INSLAW
contract.
The records
that were
available
were
inordinately
sparse and
often did
not include
any
background
of how and
why
decisions
were made.
To date,
former
Attorney
General
Meese
denies
having
knowledge
of any bias
against
INSLAW by
the
Department
or any of
its
officials.
He stated,
under oath,
that he had
little, if
any,
involvement
with the
INSLAW
controversy
and that he
recalls no
specific
discussion
with
anyone,
including
Department
officials
about
INSLAW's
contract
with
Justice
regarding
the use or
misuse of
the PROMIS
software.
This
statement
is in
direct
conflict
with Judge
Jensen's
testimony,
that he
briefed Mr.
Meese
regularly
on this
issue and
that Mr.
Meese was
very
interested
in the
details of
the
contract
and
negotiations.
One of the
most
damaging
statements
received by
the
committee
is a sworn
statement
made by
Deputy
Attorney
General
Arnold
Burns to
Office of
Professional
Responsibility
(OPR)
investigators
in 1988. In
this
statement,
Mr. Burns
stated that
Department
attorneys
had already
advised him
(sometime
in 1986)
that
INSLAW's
claim of
proprietary
rights in
the
Enhanced
PROMIS
software
was
legitimate
and that
the
Department
had waived
any rights
in these
enhancements.
Mr. Burns
was also
told by
Justice
attorneys
that the
Department
would
probably
lose the
case in
court on
this issue.
Accepting
this
statement,
it is
incredible
that the
Department,
having made
this
determination,
would
continue to
pursue its
litigation
of these
matters.
More than
$1 million
has been
spent in
litigation
on this
case by the
Justice
Department
even though
it knew in
1986 that
it did not
have a
chance to
win the
case on
merits.
This
clearly
raises the
specter
that the
Department
actions
taken
against
INSLAW in
this matter
represent
an abuse of
power of
shameful
proportions.
2. WAS
THERE A
HIGH LEVEL
CONSPIRACY?
The second
phase of
the
committee's
investigation
concentrated
on the
allegations
that high
level
officials
at the
Department
of Justice
conspired
to drive
INSLAW into
insolvency
and steal
the PROMIS
software so
it could be
used by Dr.
Earl Brian,
a former
associate
and friend
of then
Attorney
General
Edwin Meese.
Dr. Brian
is a
businessman
and
entrepreneur
who owns or
controls
several]
businesses
including
Hadron,
Inc., which
has
contracts
with the
Justice
Department,
CIA, and
other
agencies.
The
Hamiltons
and others
have
asserted
that Dr.
Brian
conspired
with high
level
Justice
officials
to sell
PROMIS to
law
enforcement
and
intelligence
agencies
worldwide.
Former
Attorney
General
Elliot
Richardson,
counsel to
INSLAW, has
alleged
that the
circumstances
involving
the theft
of the
PROMIS
software
system
constitute
a possible
criminal
conspiracy
involving
Mr. Meese,
Judge
Jensen, Dr.
Brian, and
several
current and
former
officials
at the
Department
of Justice.
Mr.
Richardson
maintains
that the
individuals
involved in
the theft
of the
Enhanced
PROMIS
system have
violated a
plethora of
Federal
criminal
statutes,
including
but not
limited to:
(1) 18 U.S.C 654 (officer or employee of the United States converting the property of another);
(2) 18 U.S.C 1001 (false statements);
(3)18 U.S.C 1621 (perjury);
(4) 18 U.S.C 1503 (obstruction of justice);
(5) 18 U.S.C 1341 (mail fraud) and
(6) 18 U.S.C. 371 (conspiracy to commit criminal offenses). Mr. Richardson further contends that the violations of Federal law associated in the theft of Enhanced PROMIS, the subsequent coverup and the illegal distribution of PROMIS fulfill the requirements for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. (the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute).
As
discussed
earlier,
the
committee's
investigation
largely
supports
the
findings of
two Federal
courts that
the
Department
"took,
converted,
stole
INSLAW'S
Enhanced
PROMIS by
"trickery,
fraud and
deceit'',
and that
this
misappropriation
involved
officials
at the
highest
levels of
the
Department
of Justice.
The recent
ruling by
the D.C.
Circuit
Court of
Appeals
does
nothing to
vitiate
those
conclusions,
the product
of an
extensive
record
compiled
under oath
by two
Federal
jurists.
While the
Department
continues
to attempt
to explain
away the
INSLAW
matter as a
simple
contract
dispute,
the
committee's
investigation
has
uncovered
other
information
which
plausibly
could
suggest a
different
conclusion
if full
access to
documents
and other
witnesses
were
permitted.
Several
individuals
have stated
under oath
that the
Enhanced
PROMIS
software
was stolen
and
distributed
internationally
in order to
provide
financial
gain to Dr.
Brian and
to further
intelligence
and foreign
policy
objectives
for the
United
States.
While it
should be
acknowledged
at the
outset that
some of the
testimony
comes from
individuals
whose past
associations
and
enterprises
are not
commendable,
corroborating
evidence
for a
number of
their
claims made
under oath
has been
found. It
should be
observed
that these
individuals
provided
testimony
with the
full
knowledge
that the
Justice
Department
could-and
would
probably be
strongly
inclined
to-prosecute
them for
perjury if
they lied
under oath.
Moreover,
we note
that the
Department
is hardly
in a
position to
negate
summarily
testimony
offered by
witnesses
who have
led less
than an
exemplary
life in
their
choice of
associations
and
activities.
As
indicated
by the
recent
prosecution
of Manuel
Noriega,
which
involved
the use of
over 40
witnesses,
the
majority of
whom were
previously
convicted
drug
traffickers,
a witness,
perceived
credibility
is not
always
indicative
of the
accuracy or
usability
in court of
the
information
provided.
Although
the
committee's
investigation
could not
reach a
definitive
conclusion
regarding a
possible
motive
behind the
misappropriation
of the
Enhanced
PROMIS
software,
the
disturbing
questions
raised,
unexplained
coincidences
and
peculiar
events that
have
surfaced
throughout
the INSLAW
case raises
the need
for further
investigation.
One area
which
requires
further
investigation
is the
allegations
made by Mr.
Michael
Riconosciuto.
Mr.
Riconosciuto,
a shady
character
allegedly
tied to
U.S.
intelligence
agencies
and
recently
convicted
on drug
charges,
alleges
that Dr.
Brian and
Mr. Peter
Videnieks
secretly
delivered
INSLAW's
Enhanced
PROMIS
software to
the Cabazon
Indian
Reservation,
located in
California,
for
"refitting"
for use by
intelligence
agencies in
the United
States and
abroad.9
When Dr.
Brian was
questioned
about his
alleged
involvement
in the
INSLAW
case, he
denied
under oath
that he had
ever met
Mr.
Riconosciuto
and stated
that he had
never heard
of the
Cabazon
Indian
Reservation.
C.
ADDITIONAL
QUESTIONS
Suspicions
of a
Department
of Justice
conspiracy
to steal
INSLAW's
PROMIS were
fueled when
Danny
Casolaro-an
investigative
writer
inquiring
into those
issues-was
found dead
in a hotel
room in
Martinsburg,
WV, where
he was to
meet a
source that
he claimed
was
critical to
his
investigation.
Mr.
Casolaro's
body was
found on
August 10,
1991, with
his wrists
slashed
numerous
times.
Following a
brief
preliminary
investigation
by local
authorities,
Mr.
Casolaro's
death was
ruled a
suicide.
The
investigation
was
reopened
later as a
result of
numerous
inquiries
from Mr.
Casolaro's
brother and
others
regarding
the
suspicious
circumstances
surrounding
his death.
The
Martinsburg
Police
investigation
subsequently
concluded
in January
1992, that
Mr.
Casolaro's
death was a
suicide.
Subsequently,
Chairman
Brooks
directed
committee
investigators
to obtain
sworn
statements
from the
FBI agent
and two
former
Federal
Organized
Crime
Strike
Force
prosecutors
in Los
Angeles who
had
information
bearing on
the
Casolaro
case. Sworn
statements
were
obtained
from former
Federal
prosecutors
Richard
Stavin and
Marvin
Rudnick on
March 13
and 14,
1992. After
initial
resistance
from the
Bureau, a
sworn
statement
was taken
from FBI
Special
Agent
Thomas
Gates on
March 25
and 26,
1992.
Special
Agent Gates
stated that
Mr.
Casolaro
claimed he
had found a
link
between the
INSLAW
matter, the
activities
taking
place at
the Cabazon
Indian
Reservation,
and a
Federal
investigation
in which
Special
Agent Gates
had been
involved
regarding
organized
crime
influence
in the
entertainment
industry.
Special
Agent Gates
stated that
Mr.
Casolaro
had several
conversations
with Mr.
Robert
Booth
Nichols in
the weeks
preceding
his death.
Mr.
Nichols,
according
to
documents
submitted
to a
Federal
court by
the FBI,
has ties
with
organized
crime and
the world
of covert
intelligence
operations.
When he
learned of
Mr.
Casolaro's
death,
Special
Agent Gates
contacted
the
Martinsburg,
WV, Police
Department
to inform
them of the
information
he had
concerning
Mr. Nichols
and Mr.
Casolaro.
The
Martinsburg
Police have
not
commented
on whether
or not they
eventually
pursued the
leads
provided by
Special
Agent
Gates.
Based on
the
evidence
collected
by the
committee,
it appears
that the
path
followed by
Danny
Casolaro in
pursuing
his
investigation
into the
INSLAW
matter
brought him
in contact
with a
number of
dangerous
individuals
associated
with
organized
crime and
the world
of covert
intelligence
operations.
The
suspicious
circumstances
surrounding
his death
have led
some law
enforcement
professionals
and others
to believe
that his
death may
not have
been a
suicide. As
long as the
possibility
exists that
Danny
Casolaro
died as a
result of
his
investigation
into the
INSLAW
matter, it
is
imperative
that
further
investigation
be
conducted.
D. EVIDENCE
OF POSSIBLE
COVERUP AND
OBSTRUCTION
One of the
principal
reasons the
committee
could not
reach any
definitive
conclusion
about
INSLAW's
allegations
of a high
criminal
conspiracy
at Justice
was the
lack of
cooperation
from the
Department.
Throughout
the two
INSLAW
investigations,
the
Congress
met with
restrictions,
delays and
outright
denials to
requests
for
information
and to
unobstructed
access to
records and
witnesses
since 1988.
The
Department
initially
attempted
to prevent
the Senate
Permanent
Subcommittee
on
Investigations
from
conducting
an
investigation
of the
INSLAW
affair.
During this
committee's
investigation,
Attorney
General
Thornburgh
repeatedly
reneged on
agreements
made with
this
committee
to provide
full and
open access
to
information
and
witnesses.
Although
the day
before a
planned
committee
meeting to
consider
the
issuance of
a subpoena
the
Department
promised
full access
to
documents
and
witnesses,
the
committee
was
compelled
to subpoena
Attorney
General
Thornburgh
to obtain
documents
needed to
complete
its
investigation.
Even then,
the
Department
failed to
provide all
the
documents
subpoenaed,
claiming
that some
of the
documents
held by the
Department's
chief
attorney in
charge of
the INSLAW
litigation
had been
misplaced
or
accidentally
destroyed.
The
Department
has not
provided a
complete
accounting
of the
number of
documents
missing nor
has it
conducted
an
investigation
to
determine
if the
documents
were stolen
or
illegally
destroyed.
Questions
regarding
the
Department's
willingness
and
objectivity
to
investigate
the charges
of possible
misconduct
of Justice
employees
remain.
That
Justice
officials
may have
too readily
concluded
that
witnesses
supporting
the
Department's
position
were
credible
while those
who did not
were
ignored or
retaliated
against
was,
perhaps,
most
painfully
demonstrated
with the
firing of
Anthony
Pasciuto,
the former
Deputy
Director,
Executive
Office of
the U.S.
Trustees.
Mr.
Pasciuto
had
informed
the
Hamiltons
that soon
after
INSLAW
filed for
chapter 11
bankruptcy
in 1985,
the Justice
Department
had planned
to petition
the court
to force
INSLAW into
chapter 7
bankruptcy
and
liquidate
its assets
including
the PROMIS
software.
His source
for this
information
was Judge
Cornelius
Blackshear
who, at the
time, was
the U.S.
Trustee for
the
Southern
District of
New York.
Judge
Blackshear
subsequently
provided
INSLAW's
attorneys
with a
sworn
statement
confirming
what Mr.
Pasciuto
had told
the
Hamiltons.
However,
following a
conversation
with a
Justice
Department
attorney
who was
representing
the
Department
in the
INSLAW
case,10
Judge
Blackshear
recanted
his earlier
sworn
statement.
Moreover,
Judge
Blackshear,
under oath,
could not
or would
not provide
committee
investigators
with a
plausible
explanation
of why he
had
recanted
his earlier
statements
to INSLAW,
Mr.
Pasciuto
and others
regarding
the Justice
Department's
efforts to
force
INSLAW out
of
business.
He did
confirm an
earlier
statement
attributed
to him that
his
recantation
was a
result of
"his desire
to hurt the
least
number of
people."
However, he
would not
elaborate
on this
enigmatic
statement.
Similarly,
Mr.
Pasciuto,
under
strong
pressure
from senior
Department
officials,
recanted
his
statement
made to the
Hamiltons
regarding
Judge
Blackshear.
It appears
that Mr.
Pasciuto
may have
been fired
from his
position
with the
Executive
Office of
U.S.
Trustees
because he
had
provided
information
to the
Hamiltons
and their
attorneys
which
undercut
the
Department's
litigating
position
before the
Bankruptcy
Court.11
This action
was based
on a
recommendation
made by the
Office of
Professional
Responsibility
(OPR). In a
memorandum
to Deputy
Attorney
General
Burns,
dated
December
18, 1987,
the OPR
concluded
that:
In our view, but for Mr. Pasciuto's highly irresponsible actions, the department would be in a much better litigation posture than it presently finds itself. Mr. Pasciuto has wholly failed to comport himself in accordance with the standard of conduct expected of an official of his position.
Mr.
Pasciuto
now states
he regrets
having
allowed
himself to
be coerced
by the
Department
into
recanting
and has
stated
under oath
to
committee
investigators
that he
stands by
his earlier
statements
made to the
Hamiltons
that Judge
Blackshear
had
informed
him that
the
Department
wanted to
force
INSLAW out
of
business.
Certainly,
Mr.
Pasciuto's
treatment
by the
Department
during his
participation
in the
INSLAW
litigation
raises
serious
questions
of how far
the
Department
will go to
protect its
interests
while
defending
itself in
litigation.
Not
unexpectedly,
Mr.
Pasciuto's
firing had
a chilling
effect on
other
potential
Department
witnesses
who might
have
otherwise
cooperated
with the
committee
in this
matter.
Judge
Blackshear,
on the
other hand,
was not
accused of
wrongdoing
by the
Department
even though
he
originally
provided
essentially
the same
information
as had Mr.
Pasciuto.
Despite
this series
of obvious
reversals,
the
Department,
after
limited
investigation,
has
apparently
satisfied
itself that
the sworn
statements
of its
witnesses,
including
Judge
Blackshear,
have
somehow
been
reconciled
on key
issues such
that no
false
statements
have been
made by any
of these
individuals.
This
position is
flatly in
opposition
to the
Bankruptcy
Court's
finding
that
several
Department
officials
may have
perjured
themselves
which was
never
seriously
investigated
by the
Department.
In
addition,
there are
serious
conflicts
and
inconsistencies
in sworn
statements
provided to
the
committee
that have
not been
resolved.
Equally
important,
the
possibility
that
witnesses,
testimony
were
manipulated
by the
Department
in order to
present a
"united
front" to
the
Congress
and the
public on
the INSLAW
case needs
to be fully
and
honestly
explored.
The
potential
for a
conflict of
interest in
the
Department's
carrying
out such an
inquiry is
high, if
not
prudently
manifest,
and
independent
scrutiny is
required.
E. JUDGE
BASON'S
ALLEGATIONS
AGAINST THE
DEPARTMENT
Judge Bason
testified,
under oath,
before the
Economic
and
Commercial
Law
Subcommittee
that the
Department's
actions
against its
critics may
have
extended
into
blocking
his
reappointment
as a
bankruptcy
judge in
1988
because of
his ruling
in INSLAW's
case. Judge
Bason was
replaced by
Martin
Teel, Jr.,
who, prior
to his
appointment,
was a
Justice
Department
attorney
heavily
involved in
the
Department's
litigation
of the
INSLAW
case.12 The
committee
was unable
to
substantiate
Judge
Bason's
charges. If
such undue
influence
did occur,
it was
subtle and
lost in the
highly
private
manner in
which judge
selection
procedures
are
conducted.
While sworn
statements
were not
taken, the
committee
investigators
interviewed
several of
the judges
involved in
the
selection
process.
The judges
who agreed
to provide
interviews
all stated
that they
had little
firsthand
knowledge
in which to
evaluate
the
candidates,
including
the
incumbent
judge. As a
result, the
members of
the
Judicial
Council had
to rely on
the
findings of
the Merit
Selection
Panel
headed by
Judge Norma
Johnson.
The Merit
Selection
Panel's
findings
were
provided to
the
Judicial
Council by
Judge
Johnson
whose oral
presentation
was
instrumental
in the
final
selection.
Judge
Johnson had
previously
worked at
the
Department
of Justice
with Stuart
Schiffer,
who led the
Department's
attempt to
have the
District
Court
remove
Judge Bason
from the
INSLAW
case. Mr.
Schiffer is
also the
official
who argued
vociferously
against the
appointment
of an
independent
counsel on
the INSLAW
case in a
memorandum
to Deputy
Attorney
General
Arthur
Burns.
Judge
Johnson
also served
in the D.C.
Superior
Court with
Judge Tim
Murphy from
1970
through
1980. Judge
Murphy
subsequently
worked
directly
for Mr.
Brewer on
the PROMIS
contract.
The
committee,
however,
has not at
this date
found any
evidence
that Judge
Johnson had
specific
discussions
with Mr.
Schiffer or
anyone else
at the
Department
of Justice
about Judge
Bason, the
INSLAW case
or the
bankruptcy
judicial
selection
process.
The
committee's
investigation
revealed
that the
selection
process was
largely
informal,
undocumented
and highly
subjective.
For
example,
several
members of
the
Judicial
Council
indicated
that one of
the primary
factors
influencing
the
non-reappointment
of Judge
Bason, was
the poor
administrative
condition
of his
court.
These same
members
admitted
that they
had no
firsthand
knowledge
of the
administrative
condition
and based
this
opinion on
the reports
of the
Merit
Selection
Panel and
Judge
Johnson.
This was
corroborated
by the
discovery
of a
confidential
memorandum
written by
a member of
the Merit
Selection
Panel which
was highly
critical of
Judge Bason
and the
administrative
condition
of the
Bankruptcy
Court.
While this
memorandum
had been
seen by
several
judges
during the
selection
process,
committee
investigators
were unable
to
determine
who
authored
it. The
committee's
investigation
did not
reveal any
evidence to
support the
criticisms
raised in
the
memorandum.
Martin
Bloom,
Clerk of
the
Bankruptcy
Court,
indicated
in his
sworn
statement
to
committee
investigators
that under
Judge Bason,
the
administrative
condition
of the
court
vastly
improved.
These
sentiments
were echoed
by Chief
Judge
Aubrey
Robinson
who
consistently
complimented
Judge Bason
on his
efforts to
improve the
administrative
condition
of the
Bankruptcy
Court in
his remarks
to the
Annual
Judicial
Conference.
F.
CONCLUSION
The history
of the
Department's
behavior in
the INSLAW
case
dramatically
illustrates
its (1)
reflexive
hostility
and "circle
the wagons"
approach
toward
outside
investigations;
(2)
inability
or
unwillingness
to look
objectively
at charges
of
wrongdoing
by high
level
Justice
officials,
particularly
when the
agency
itself is a
defendant
in
litigation;
and, (3)
belligerence
toward
Justice
employees
with views
that run
counter to
those of
the
agency's
upper
management.
The fact
that the
Department
failed to
recognize a
need for an
independent
investigation
of the
INSLAW
matter for
more than 7
years is
remarkable.
Failure to
do so has
effectively
shielded
officials
who may
have
committed
wrongdoing
from
investigation
and
prosecution.
As already
documented
and
confirmed
by two
Federal
judges, the
Department's
actions in
the INSLAW
case have
greatly
harmed the
company and
its owners.
These
actions, as
they
pertain to
the dispute
with INSLAW
over the
misappropriation
of the
PROMIS
software,
were taken
with the
full
knowledge
and support
of high
level
Justice
officials.
The harm to
the company
was further
perpetuated
by
succeeding
high level
officials,
such as
former
Attorney
General
Richard
Thornburgh,
who not
only failed
to
objectively
investigate
the serious
charges
raised by
the
Hamiltons
and their
attorney,
former
Attorney
General
Elliot
Richardson,
but also
delayed and
rebuffed
effective
and
expeditious
outside
investigation
of the
matter by
Congress.
The
Department
of Justice
is this
nation's
most
visible
guarantor
of the
notion that
wrongdoing
will be
sought out
and
punished
irrespective
of the
identity of
the actors
involved.
Moreover,
its mandate
is to
protect all
private
citizens
from
illegal
activities
that
undermine
the public
trust. The
Department's
handling of
the INSLAW
case has
seriously
undermined
its
credibility
and
reputation
in playing
such a
role.
Congress
and the
executive
must take
immediate
and
forceful
steps to
restore
public
confidence
and faith
in our
system of
justice,
which
cannot be
undermined
by the very
agent
entrusted
with
enforcement
of our laws
and
protections
afforded
every
citizen. In
view of the
history
surrounding
the INSLAW
affair and
the serious
implications
of evidence
presented
by the
Hamiltons,
two court
proceedings
in the
judicial
branch and
the
committee's
own
investigation,
there is a
clear need
for further
investigation.
The
committee
believes
that the
only way in
which
INSLAW's
allegations
can be
adequately
and fully
investigated
is by the
appointment
of an
independent
counsel.
The
committee
is aware
that on
November
13, 1991,
Attorney
General
Barr
appointed
Nicholas
Bua, a
retired
Federal
judge from
Chicago, as
his special
counsel to
investigate
and advise
him on the
INSLAW
controversy.
The
committee
eagerly
awaits
Judge Bua's
findings;
however, as
long as the
investigation
of
wrongdoing
by former
and current
high level
Justice
officials
remains
under the
ultimate
control of
the
Department
itself,
there will
always be
serious
doubt about
the
objectivity
and
thoroughness
of the
inquiry.